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Abstract
Shamir proposed in 1984 the first identity-based signature scheme, whose security relies on the RSA problem. A similar scheme
was proposed by Guillou and Quisquater in 1988. Formal security of these schemes was not argued and/or proved until many
years later [D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures, Journal of Cryptology 13 (3)
(2000) 361–396; Y. Dodis, J. Katz, S. Xu, M. Yung, Strong key-insulated signature schemes, in: Proceedings of PKC’03, in:
LNCS, vol. 2567, Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 130–144; M. Bellare, C. Namprempre, G. Neven, Security proofs for identity-based
identification and signature schemes, in: Proceedings of Eurocrypt’04, in: LNCS, vol. 3027, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 268–286].
Taking the Guillou–Quisquater scheme as the starting point, we design and analyze in this work ring signature schemes and
distributed ring signature schemes for identity-based scenarios whose security is based on the hardness of the RSA problem. These
are the first identity-based ring signature schemes which do not employ bilinear pairings. Furthermore, the resulting schemes satisfy
an interesting property: the real author(s) of a ring signature can later open the anonymity and prove that he is actually the person
who signed the message.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Identity-based (from now on, denoted also as ID-based) cryptography was introduced by Shamir [24] in 1984 as
an alternative to traditional public key cryptography, based on infrastructures (PKI). In PKI-based cryptography, each
user generates on his own his secret and public keys. A certification authority must sign a digital certificate which
links the identity of the user and his public key. The validity of this certificate must be checked before using the public
key of the user, when encrypting a message to him or verifying a signature from him. Obviously, the management of
digital certificates decreases the efficiency of practical implementations of public key cryptosystems.
The idea of identity-based cryptography is that the public key of any user is inferred directly from his identity
(e-mail address, telephone number, etc.). Later, the user contacts a master entity who uses some secret information
to compute the secret key related to the identity of the user. This secret key is sent to the user throughout a secure
channel.
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In his paper [24], Shamir proposed an identity-based signature scheme from the RSA primitive [21]. In 1988,
Guillou and Quisquater proposed a similar RSA identity-based signature scheme [16], which is constructed from a
zero-knowledge identification protocol. Note that the security of these first proposals was not proved or argued (more
or less explicitly) until the appearance of [20,13,3]. After those initial schemes, the following breakthrough result in
the area of identity-based cryptography came in 2001, when Boneh and Franklin designed an efficient identity-based
public key encryption scheme [6]. In the design, they used as a tool bilinear pairings, a kind of maps which can be
constructed on some elliptic curves. Since the appearance of this work, a lot of identity-based schemes have been
proposed for encryption, signature, key agreement, etc., and they all employ such bilinear pairings (see [27] for an
overview).
However, it is not easy to find suitable elliptic curves where bilinear pairings can be efficiently implemented.
Therefore, it is still desirable to find schemes for identity-based scenarios which do not need to employ bilinear
pairings. Schemes which involve many public keys, like (distributed) ring signature schemes, are specially suitable to
be considered in an identity-based framework. Let us recall that, in a ring signature scheme, a user signs a message
anonymously on behalf of a group of users that he chooses ad hoc and which contains himself; the verifier is convinced
that some member of the group has signed, but he has no information about who the actual author of the signature is.
In distributed ring signature schemes, the idea is the same but now a subset of users cooperate to anonymously sign a
message on behalf of a family of possible signing subsets that they choose ad hoc.
The previous paragraph clearly motivates this work. We take the Guillou–Quisquater identity-based signature
scheme [16] as the starting point to design two ring signature schemes for identity-based scenarios. These schemes can
be extended to distributed ring signature schemes, as well. In particular, these are the first (distributed) ring signature
schemes which run in identity-based scenarios without employing bilinear pairings. The security of the proposed
schemes can be formally proved, by reduction to the hardness of the RSA problem; the security proof of the first
scheme uses the Ring Forking Lemmas introduced in [17]. The two proposed ring signature schemes satisfy different
properties: the second one enjoys a better security reduction, whereas the first one is more efficient (signing and
verifying) in practice, because operations can be performed in parallel.
Finally, we show that the ring signature schemes that we propose in this work enjoy an interesting property: the real
signer (or signers, in the distributed case) can later broadcast some value to open the anonymity and prove that he was
the author of the ring signature. This can be useful in some scenarios where anonymity is desirable at a first moment,
but later it can be advantageous for the signer to reveal his identity, if the signed message is received favourably, for
example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the definitions related to identity-based
signatures (protocols and security), as well as the scheme proposed by Guillou and Quisquater in [16]. In Section 3 we
provide formal definitions for identity-based ring signature schemes, and we adapt to the identity-based framework
the concept of generic ring signature scheme and the Ring Forking Lemmas introduced in [17]. In Sections 4 and 5
we describe our two ring signature schemes for the identity-based framework, which do not employ bilinear pairings,
and formally analyze their security. In Section 6 we discuss some interesting properties of the proposed schemes, for
example the capability of a real signer to open later the anonymity of a ring signature and reveal his identity. We
also describe a distributed ring signature scheme which is inferred quite naturally from the proposed ring signature
schemes. The work is concluded in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we review the definition of identity-based signatures, and the identity-based signature scheme
proposed by Guillou and Quisquater in [16].
2.1. Identity-based signature schemes
An identity-based signature scheme consists of the following probabilistic algorithms:
Setup: it takes as input a security parameter k and returns, on the one hand, the system public parameters params
and, on the other hand, the value master-key, which is known only to the master entity.
Extract: it takes as inputs params, master-key and a string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ specifying some identity; the algorithm
returns a private key SKID to the user with identity ID. This step must be done over a secure channel.
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Signature: the signature algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a secret key SKID, and returns
a signature θ for the message M .
Verification: finally, the verification algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M , a signature θ and an identity
ID; it returns 1 if the verification is correct, and 0 if not.
The security of ID-based signature schemes is formalized by considering the strongest possible kind of attacks:
chosen messages/identities attacks. We do not give the details of the definition, because this paper is focused on ring
signatures and later we are going to formalize in detail the security definitions for ring signatures. Intuitively, a chosen
message/identities attacker is given params as initial input. Then he can make two kinds of queries: extraction queries
for identities of his choice, obtaining as answer the secret keys corresponding to these identities; and signing queries
for pairs (message,identity) of his choice, obtaining as answer valid signatures for such pairs. At the end, the attacker
is successful if he is able to obtain a tuple (M, ID, θ) such that this tuple is different from the ones obtained in the
signing queries, the signature is valid, and the secret key for the identity ID has not been asked as an extraction query
during the attack.
If a scheme is proved to resist these kind of attacks, then it is said to be existentially unforgeable under chosen
messages/identities attacks.
2.2. Guillou–Quisquater identity-based signature scheme
Now we describe in detail the specification of the identity-based signature scheme proposed by Guillou and
Quisquater in [16]. The protocols that take part in the scheme are detailed below.
Setup: on input of a security parameter k, the master entity generates two random k-bit prime numbers p and q. Then
he computes N = pq. For some fixed parameter ` (for example ` = 160), he chooses at random a prime number e
satisfying 2` < e < 2`+1 and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1, and computes d = e−1modφ(N ). Furthermore, the master entity
chooses two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`. The public outputs of this setup algorithm
are params= (k, `, N , e, H1, H2). The secret information stored by the master entity is master-key= (p, q, d).
Extract: when a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ requests for his secret key, the master entity computes a RSA
signature on the message H1(ID) ∈ Z∗N . That is, he computes SK = H1(ID)d mod N . Then, this value SK is sent
to the user throughout a secure channel. The user can verify if the received secret key is consistent by checking if
SK e = H1(ID)mod N .
Signature: to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ by using his secret key SK , a user with identity ID acts as follows:
(1) he chooses uniformly at random an element A ∈ Z∗N ;
(2) he computes the values R = Ae mod N and h = H2(ID,M, R);
(3) finally, he computes the value σ = A · SK h mod N .
The resulting signature is θ = (M, R, σ ).
Verification: given a signature θ = (ID,M, R, σ ), the recipient acts as follows:
(1) he computes h = H2(ID,M, R);
(2) he checks if σ e = R · H1(ID)h mod N .
If the check is correct, then the output of the verification algorithm is 1 (valid signature). Otherwise, the output is 0
(invalid signature).
Note that the value of ` must be large enough in order to avoid collisions in the hash function H2. However, we
need e ≥ 2`, so the larger ` is, the more inefficient the scheme becomes, because each computation/verification of
a signature requires the computation of an eth modular power. A reasonable choice of the parameter is ` = 160 (as
discussed in [12], a work dealing with RSA signatures where the exponent e must be prime, as well).
This scheme was proved to be existentially unforgeable under chosen messages/identities attacks, under the
assumption that the RSA problem [21] is hard, some years after its appearance [20,13,3]. In the proof, the hash
function H is assumed to behave as a totally random function. This unrealistic but useful and well-accepted model is
known as the random oracle model [4].
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3. Identity-based ring signature schemes
In a ring signature scheme, a user signs a message anonymously on behalf of a group (or ring) of users which
contains himself. This group is not fixed, but chosen ad hoc by the real signer just before computing the signature.
The verifier is convinced that some member of the ring has signed, but he does not have any information about who
the actual signer is.
Ring signatures were formally introduced in [22] and have received a lot of attention since then. Some applications
of ring signatures are the leakage of secrets, the generation of signatures with designated verifiers, or the computation
of concurrent signatures [8]. Recent advances in the area of ring signatures include the design of schemes where the
signatures have constant length [14] or schemes which can be proved secure in the standard model [5,23].
With respect to identity-based ring signature schemes, all the existing proposals (see [26] for the first one, or [2]
for a scheme which is provably secure in the standard model) are designed by using bilinear pairings. Note that
the results known for standard (PKI-based) ring signatures, in particular the existence of schemes without bilinear
pairings, do not extend to the identity-based scenario. For example, the generic construction of ID-based signatures
with additional properties in [15] does not work properly for ring signatures, because the signer should interact with
the other members of the ring before signing, in order to obtain their certified public keys. The resulting scheme,
therefore, would not be an ID-based ring signature scheme as defined below (note that no interaction is required in the
ring signature generation).
The protocols that take part in an ID-based ring signature scheme are the following ones:
Setup: it takes as input a security parameter k and returns, on the one hand, the system public parameters params
and, on the other hand, the value master-key, which is known only to the master entity.
Extract: it takes as inputs params, master-key and a string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ specifying some identity; the algorithm
returns a private key SKID to the user with identity ID. This step must be done over a secure channel.
Ring Signature Generation: this algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M , a secret key SKIDs and a ring of
identities U = {ID1, . . . , IDn} such that IDs ∈ U . The output is a ring signature that we will denote as Θ .
Ring Signature Verification: it takes as inputs params, a ring of identities U , a message M and a ring signature Θ ;
the output is 1 if the verification is correct, and 0 if not.
With respect to the properties that a ring signature scheme must satisfy, we can list correctness, anonymity and
unforgeability.
Correctnessmeans that a signature which is properly computed by a member of the ring, using his secret key, must
be accepted as valid by the verification algorithm with probability 1.
Anonymitymeans that, given a valid ring signatureΘ for some ring U computed by using the signing protocol with
input the secret key of some user Ui ∈ U , the probability that an adversary which takes Θ as input gives Ui as output
must be exactly 1/n, where n is the number of members of the signing ring U . This must hold even if all the secret
keys of the members of the ring are made public.
Unforgeability means, intuitively, that any attacker who does not know any of the secret keys of a ring of identities
is not able to obtain a valid (and new) ring signature involving this ring. This property is formalized with a game
between the attacker and a challenger, that we describe in Section 4. We consider exact security, i.e. we count all the
queries made by the attacker, his running time and his success probability.
3.1. Unforgeability definition
An ID-based ring signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen messages/identities attacks if any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a negligible advantage in the following game, that he plays against a
challenger:
Setup: the challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm of the scheme. He gives to the
adversary the resulting params. The challenger keeps secret the master-key.
Queries: the adversary makes different queries to the challenger.
• Extraction queries < IDi >. The challenger responds by running algorithm Extract of the scheme, to obtain the
private key SKi which corresponds to the identity IDi . The value SKi is sent to the adversary.
• Ring signature queries < U ′,M ′ >. The challenger first obtains the secret key for one of the identities in the ring
U ′, and then runs the ring signature protocol taking as input this secret key and the message M ′. The resulting
signature Θ ′ is given to the adversary.
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• Hash queries. If the scheme involves some hash function Hi which is assumed to behave as a random oracle [4]
in the security proof, then the challenger must answer queries of the adversary to this oracle, providing him with
consistent and totally random values.
These queries can be done in an adaptive way; that is, each query may depend on the answers obtained to the previous
queries.
Forgery: the adversary A outputs a tuple (U,M,Θ). We say that A succeeds if:
• the signature Θ is valid, meaning that the ring signature verification protocol outputs 1 when run with inputs
(params,U,M,Θ); and
• for all IDi ∈ U , the adversary has not requested an extraction query for IDi ; and
• Θ has not been obtained as an answer to any ring signature query < U,M >.
The advantage of such an adversary is defined as
AdvCMAA (k) = Pr[A succeeds ].
Definition 1. An adversary A is a (T, ε, Qi , Qe, Qs)-forger against an ID-based ring signature scheme if he runs in
time at most T , his advantage is ε, and he is allowed to make Qi queries to the random oracle which models Hi , to
make Qe extraction queries, and to make Qs signature queries.
3.2. Generic ring signature schemes
In [17], a family of generic ring signature schemes was presented for the PKI setting, following the ideas in [20] for
standard signatures. The definition of generic ring signature scheme can be easily adapted to the identity-based setting.
Namely, an ID-based ring signature scheme is generic if signatures have the form (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ),
where:
• U = {ID1, . . . , IDn} is the signing ring, with n users/identities;
• M is the signed message;
• R1, . . . , Rn take their values randomly in a large set in such a way that Ri 6= R j for all i 6= j ;
• hi = H(U,M, IDi , Ri ), for i = 1, . . . , n, for some public hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`, where ` is a fixed
parameter of the scheme;
• given U,M and the values R1, . . . , Rn , there is a unique value σ such that (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) is a
valid ring signature.
The authors of [17] extend the Forking Lemmas in [20] to the scenario of generic ring signature schemes (in
the PKI setting). A slight modification of their Ring Forking Lemma is stated below (the proof is essentially
the same as in [17]). It is easy to see that both the theorem and the proof are valid also for the identity-based
setting. The value VQ,n denotes the number of different n-permutations of Q elements (without repetitions); that
is, VQ,n = Q(Q − 1) · . . . · (Q − n + 1).
Theorem 2 (The Ring Forking Lemma). Consider a generic (identity-based) ring signature scheme with parameter
` ≥ 7 for the hash function. Let B be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine whose input only consists of
public data and which can ask Q queries to the random oracle that models the hash function of the scheme.
We assume that B produces, within time bound T and with probability of success at least ε, a valid ring signature
(U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) for a ring U of n users such that n ≤ 2`−1.
Then, within time T ′ ≤ 2T , and with probability ε′ ≥ ε265VQ,n , by executing B with random
instantiations of the hash function we can obtain two valid ring signatures (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) and
(U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h′1, . . . , h′n, σ ′) such that h j 6= h′j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and hi = h′i for all i = 1, . . . , n such
that i 6= j .
This result will be used to prove the unforgeability of the first scheme that we propose, in the following section,
since this scheme belongs to the family of identity-based generic ring signature schemes.
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4. Our first identity-based ring signature scheme
We extend the Guillou–Quisquater identity-based signature scheme, described in Section 2.2, to the scenario of
ring signatures, obtaining an identity-based ring signature scheme from the RSA primitive, which does not employ
pairings. The protocols of the scheme are depicted below.
Setup: on input of a security parameter k, the master entity generates two random k-bit prime numbers p and q. Then
he computes N = pq. For some fixed parameter ` (for example ` = 160), he chooses at random a prime number e
satisfying 2` < e < 2`+1 and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1, and computes d = e−1modφ(N ). Furthermore, the master entity
chooses two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`. The public outputs of this setup algorithm
are params= (k, `, N , e, H1, H2). The secret information stored by the master entity is master-key= (p, q, d).
Extract: when a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ requests for his secret key, the master entity computes SK =
H1(ID)d mod N . This value SK is sent to the user throughout a secure channel. The user can verify if the received
secret key is consistent by checking if SK e = H1(ID)mod N .
Ring Signature Generation: to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ on behalf of a ring of identities U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, a
user with identity IDs ∈ U and secret key SKs acts as follows:
(1) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= s, choose Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise different. Compute Ri = Aei mod N
and hi = H2(U,M, IDi , Ri ), for all i 6= s.
(2) Choose at random A ∈ Z∗N .
(3) Compute Rs = Ae · ∏
i 6=s
H1(IDi )−hi mod N . If Rs = 1mod N or Rs = Ri for some i 6= s, then go to step 2.
(4) Compute hs = H2(U,M, IDs, Rs).
(5) Compute σ = SK hss · A · ∏
i 6=s
Ai mod N .
(6) Define the signature of the message M made by the ring U = {ID1, . . . , IDn} to be Θ =
(U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
Ring Signature Verification: The validity of the signature is verified by the recipient of the message by checking that
hi = H2(U,M, IDi , Ri ), for i = 1, . . . , n and that the following equation fulfills:
σ e =
∏
1≤i≤n
(
Ri · H1(IDi )hi
)
mod N .
4.1. Correctness and anonymity
The proposed identity-based scheme is a generic ring signature scheme. It is easy to see that it satisfies the
correctness property: if a ring signature is generated by following the described protocol, then the verification process
always accepts it as valid.
With respect to anonymity, given a valid ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) and any identity
ID j ∈ U , the probability that ID j generates the signature Θ when he runs the signing algorithm can be exactly
computed; this probability does not depend on the considered identity ID j , so it is the same for all the members of the
signing ring. This implies that the signature gives no information about its actual author.
4.2. Unforgeability of the scheme
Regarding unforgeability, it is possible to compute the exact security of the scheme, by considering a hypothetic
(T, ε, Q1, Q2, Qe, Qs)-forger against it. Since the scheme is generic, we can use Theorem 2 to reduce the
unforgeability of our scheme to the hardness of solving the RSA problem.
Definition 3. Let N = pq, where p and q are two k-bit prime numbers. Let e be a random prime number, greater
than 2` for some fixed parameter `, such that gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1. Let y be a random element in Z∗n .
We say that an algorithm F solves the RSA problem if it receives as input the tuple (N , e, y) and outputs an
element z such that ze = ymod N .
Note that the fact that the element e is a primer greater than a fixed parameter 2` does not affect the hardness of the
original RSA problem (where e is a random number in Z∗φ(N )), in principle, because existing attacks to this problem
work precisely when the exponent e is small.
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We now prove that a hypothetic successful attack against the proposed ID-based ring signature scheme could be
used to construct an algorithm which solves the RSA problem with non-negligible probability and in polynomial time.
Since this is assumed to be unfeasible, we conclude that there cannot exist successful attacks against our scheme, and
so it is secure. The proof is in the random oracle model for the hash functions H1 and H2.
Theorem 4. Let A be a (T, ε, Q1, Q2, Qe, Qs)-forger against the proposed identity-based ring signature scheme
with security parameter k and parameter ` ≥ 7 for the hash function, such that Qs ≤ 2k/24 and Q2 ≤ 2
k/2
3 .
Then the RSA problem described in Definition 3 can be solved with probability ε′ ≥ ε21560 QeVQ2,nˆ and within time
T ′ ≤ 2T +2Q2+4(Q1+ nˆQs)Texp, where nˆ is the total number of identities involved in the scheme, and Texp denotes
the time needed to compute a modular exponentiation.
Proof. Let (N , e, y) be an instance of the RSA problem, as stated in Definition 3. We are going to construct a
probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine F satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2; therefore, F will be allowed
to make Q2 queries to the random oracle which models the behavior of the hash function H2. This machine F will use
the attackerA against the ID-based ring signature scheme as a sub-routine:F must perfectly simulate the environment
of A. At the end, we will apply the result of Theorem 2 to F , and we will obtain from that the necessary information
to solve the initial instance of the RSA problem.
Our goal is therefore, given (N , e, y), to compute a value z ∈ Z∗N such that ze = ymod N . We initialize the
machine F giving the public data (N , e, y) as input to it. The machine F runs the attacker A against the ID-based
ring signature scheme, answering all the queries that A makes. The two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N and
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`, where ` is fixed by F , will be modelled as random functions, so their values will be computed
and stored by F . The RSA public key of the master entity is defined to be (N , e), and sent to the attacker A.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that A asks the random oracle H1 for the value H1(ID) before asking
for the secret key of ID.
Let us define µ = (5/6)1/Qe . If we consider attacks where Qe = 0, then we define µ = 0.
The machine F constructs a table T ABH1 to simulate the random oracle H1 (note that we are employing the
well-known technique introduced by Coron in [11]). Every time an identity IDi is asked by A to the oracle H1, the
machine F acts as follows: first F checks if this input is already in the table; if this is the case, then F sends to A the
corresponding relation H1(IDi ) = PKi . Otherwise, the machine F chooses a bit βi ∈ {0, 1}, which will be βi = 0
with probability µ, and βi = 1 with probability 1 − µ. Then, F chooses at random a different element xi ∈ Z∗N and
defines PKi = yβi xei mod N . The entry (IDi , PKi , xi , βi ) is stored in the table T ABH1 . The relation H1(IDi ) = PKi
is sent to A. The condition PKi 6= PK j must be satisfied for all the different entries i 6= j of the table; if this is not
the case, the process is repeated for one of these users.
Since we are assuming that H1 behaves as a random function, and the values PKi are all randomly chosen, the
information that A receives in this step is consistent.
Later, every time A asks for the secret key corresponding to an identity IDi , the machine F looks for IDi in the
table T ABH1 . If βi = 0, then F sends SKi = xi to A (note that SK ei = PKi mod N , as desired). If βi = 1, the
machine F cannot answer and halts. Note that the probability that F halts in this process is less than 1− µQe = 16 .
On the other hand, when A makes a query to the random oracle H2, the machine F can ask its own oracle for this
hash function, and then return to A the obtained answer.
Finally, the attackerA can ask for Qs valid ring signatures for messages M ′ and rings of identities U ′ (for simplicity,
we denote U ′ = {ID1, . . . , IDn′}, where n′ ≤ nˆ). We assume that A has not asked for the secret key of any of the
identities in U ′ because, otherwise, A could obtain a valid ring signature by itself. As well, we assume that A has
already asked for the public key PKi = H1(IDi ) to the random oracle H1, for all the identities IDi ∈ U ′. Therefore,
there exist entries (IDi , PKi , xi , βi ) in the table T ABH1 , for i = 1, . . . , n′. To answer such a signature query, the
machine F proceeds as follows:
• If βi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, then PKi = H1(IDI ) = (xi )e mod N , so F knows the secret key for this
identity and can easily compute a valid ring signature for the pair (U ′,M ′), by using the signing procedure.
• If βi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n′, then F does the following:
(1) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, i 6= s, choose Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise different; compute
Ri = Aei mod N .
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(2) By querying the random oracle H2, compute hi = H2(U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri ), for all i 6= s. We can assume that A
will later ask the random oracle H2 with these inputs.
(3) Choose at random hs ∈ {0, 1}`.
(4) Choose at random σ ′ ∈ Z∗N .
(5) Compute Rs = (σ ′)e · H1(IDs)−hs · ∏
i 6=s
(
R−1i · H1(IDi )−hi
)
mod N . If Rs = 1mod N or Rs = Ri for some
i 6= s, then go back to the previous step.
(6) At this point, the machine F “falsifies” the random oracle H2, by imposing the relation H2(U ′,M ′, IDs, Rs) =
hs . Later, if A asks the random oracle H2 for this input, then F will answer with the same hs .
(7) Return the signature Θ ′ = (U ′,M ′, R1, . . . , Rn′ , h1, . . . , hn′ , σ ′).
Since h′ is a random value and we are in the random oracle model for H2, the information provided to A is
indistinguishable from what A would see in a real execution of the signing protocol. However, there is some risk of
“collisions” because of the values falsified by F in step 6 of the simulation above.
Note that, in particular, no Ri can appear with probability greater than 1/2k in a signature produced by the
considered scheme. Two kinds of collisions can occur:
• A tuple (U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri ) that F outputs, inside a simulated ring signature, has been asked before to the random
oracle H2 by A. The probability of such a collision is, however, less than Q2 · Qs · 12k ≤ 16 .• The same tuple (U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri ) is output by F in two different simulated ring signatures. Using a well-known
result from probability theory (sometimes known as the birthday paradox), we have that the probability of this
collision is less than Q
2
s
2 · 12k ≤ 16 .
Altogether, the probability of collisions is less than 1/3. Now we can compute the probability that F obtains a
valid ring signature:
εF = Pr[F succeeds]
= Pr[F does not halt AND no-collisions in the simulations AND A succeeds]
≥ Pr[A succeeds | F does not halt AND no-collisions in the simulations]
· (1− Pr[F halts OR collisions in the simulations]) ≥ ε(1− 1
6
− 1
3
)
= ε
2
.
On the other hand, the execution time of the machine F is TF ≤ T + Q2 + 2(Q1 + nˆQs)Texp, where Texp is the
time needed to compute a modular exponentiation. Summing up, we have a Turing machine F that forges a generic
signature scheme in time TF and with probability εF ≥ ε2 . Now we apply Theorem 2 to the machine F , with respect
to the hash function H2.
This means that, by executing twice the machine F with different instantiations of the hash function
H2, we will obtain in time T ′ ≤ 2TF and with probability ε˜′ ≥ ε
2
F
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two valid ring signatures
(U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) and (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h′1, . . . , h′n, σ ′), for the same message M and the same
ring U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, such that h j 6= h′j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and hi = h′i for all i = 1, . . . , n such that
i 6= j . This is because the values (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn) have been chosen before the random oracles H2 and H ′2 differ
(the well-known oracle replay technique). Then we have that
σ e =
∏
1≤i≤n
(
Ri · H1(IDi )hi
)
mod N
(σ ′)e =
∏
1≤i≤n
(
Ri · H1(IDi )h′i
)
mod N .
Dividing these two equations, we obtain
(
σ/σ ′
)e = H1(ID j )h j−h′j mod N . Now we look again in the table
T ABH1 , and look for the entry (ID j , PK j , x j , β j ) corresponding to the identity ID j ; since the forgeries of A are
valid, then the secret key of user ID j has not been queried and so, with probability 1 − µ, we have β j = 1 and
PK j = H1(ID j ) = yxej mod N .
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Then the relation becomes
(
σ/σ ′
)e · x (h′j−h j )ej = yh j−h′j mod N . Since h j and h′j are outputs of the hash function
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`, we have that |h j − h′j | < 2` < e. Furthermore, the element e is a prime number, so it holds
gcd(e, h j − h′j ) = 1. This means that there exist two integers a and b such that ae + b(h j − h′j ) = 1 (applying
Bezout’s identity). Finally, the value
z =
(
σ/σ ′ · xh
′
j−h j
j
)b
· ya mod N
is the solution of the given instance of the RSA problem. In effect, we have
ze =
(
σ/σ ′ · xh
′
j−h j
j
)eb
· yae = y(h j−h′j )b · yae = yae+b(h j−h′j ) = y mod N .
Summing up, we have been able to solve the RSA problem with probability
ε′ = (1− µ)ε˜′ ≥ (1− µ) ε
2
F
65VQ2,nˆ
≥ (1− µ) (ε/2)
2
65VQ2,nˆ
≥ ε
2
1560 QeVQ2,nˆ
.
We have used that 1 − µ = 1 − (5/6)1/Qe ≥ 1/6Qe (applying Taylor’s series methodology to the function
f (x) = 1− (1− x)1/Qe and then fixing x = 1/6).
Finally, the total time needed to solve the RSA problem has been T ′ ≤ 2TF ≤ 2T +2Q2+4(Q1+ nˆQs)Texp. 
If we consider attackers who cannot corrupt any user, then we have Qe = 0 and the security result becomes
ε′ ≥ ε2147VQ2,nˆ .
The stated result gives the exact relation between the security of the ring signature scheme and the hardness of
the RSA problem. This is useful at the time of choosing the parameters (length of the keys), if one wants to securely
implement the scheme with respect to the best known algorithms which solve the RSA problem. In this particular
case, the obtained security reduction is quite bad, even if we assume that Qe = 0 and that the best way of solving
the RSA problem is by factoring N . For example, suppose we want to ensure that this scheme will resist any attack
running in time T ≤ 260 and with success probability ε ≈ 2−10, which is allowed to make Q2 = 260 queries to the
hash function H2. The theorem says that if such an attack exists, then the RSA problem can be solved in expected
time
T ′
ε′
≈ T · 147VQ2,nˆ
ε2
≈ 2
60 · 28 · (260)nˆ
2−20
.
For nˆ = 2 (i.e. when the ring signature is used as a designated verifier signature, or to construct concurrent
signatures), this gives an expected time T ′/ε′ ≈ 2208 for solving the RSA problem, which contradicts the best
known results for factoring—e.g. the expected time to factor a k-bit integer with Number Field Sieve, NFS, is
O
(
exp
(
(64k/9)
1
3 (ln k)
2
3
))
—only if the length k of the RSA modulus N is at least of 104 bits. If one wants to
use the system with larger rings of users, for example with nˆ = 10, then the obtained expected time for solving the
RSA problem is T ′/ε′ ≈ 2690, which leads to an improvement of NFS only when the length of the employed RSA
modulus is over 105 bits.
Therefore, and taking into account this proof of security, the scheme is hardly implementable in practice if one
wants to ensure security against powerful (but realistic) attacks, specially for applications which involve rings with
many users, that is, when nˆ increases. For this reason, we present in the following section a different scheme, where
the security reduction to the hardness of the RSA problem is better, in particular independent of the cardinality of the
considered rings.
5. A different scheme with better security reduction
In this new scheme, the Setup and Extract protocols are identical to that in the previously presented scheme (see
Section 4). With respect to the signing and verifying protocols, they work as follows.
Ring Signature Generation: to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ on behalf of a ring of identities U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, a
user with identity IDs ∈ U and secret key SKs acts as follows:
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(1) Choose uniformly at random A ∈ Z∗N and define R = Ae mod N . Compute cs+1 = H2(U,M, IDs, R).
(2) For i = s + 1, . . . , s − 1 (where the index i is considered modulo n), choose Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random.
Compute Ri = Aei mod N and ci+1 = H2(U,M, IDi , Ri PK cii ).
(3) Compute As = A/SK css mod N .
(4) Define the signature of the message M made by the ring U = {ID1, . . . , IDn} to be Θ =
(U,M, c0, A0, . . . , An−1).
Ring Signature Verification: to verify the validity of a ring signature Θ = (U,M, c0, A0, . . . , An−1), the recipient
does the following:
(1) For i = 0, . . . , n − 1, compute Ri = Aei mod N and ci+1 = H2(U,M, IDi , Ri PK cii ).
(2) Accept the signature as valid if and only if cn = c0.
In fact, the design of this second scheme follows the ideas behind the design of the pairing-based scheme of Zhang
and Kim [26], whereas the first proposed scheme, in Section 4, follows the design ideas of the pairing-based scheme of
Herranz and Sa´ez [18]. There are some differences between these two design principles: even if the required number
of operations for signing and verifying is the same in the two schemes (essentially, 2n modular exponentiations), the
first scheme in Section 4 can be implemented more efficiently in practice, because these 2n exponentiations can be
computed in parallel, whereas in this second scheme the operations must be computed in an iterative way.
5.1. Correctness and anonymity
Again, it is quite straightforward to see that the scheme satisfies the correctness property. The anonymity property
holds unconditionally, and this fact can be proved with the same technique as in the previous scheme: given a fixed
valid ring signature, one can exactly compute the probability that each user of the ring obtains this signature when he
applies the signing procedure. This probability does not depend on the specific user, it is the same for all the members
of the ring, which implies that any of the identities in the ring has the same probability to be the author of the signature.
5.2. Unforgeability
We first state a well-known lemma that we will use in the security proof of this scheme. A proof of this lemma can
be found, for example, in [20].
Lemma 5 (The Splitting Lemma). Let A ⊂ X × Y be a set verifying that Pr [(x, y) ∈ A] ≥ δ. For any α < δ, let us
define
B = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | Pr
y′∈Y
[
(x, y′) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α} and B¯ = (X × Y )\B.
Then the following statements hold:
(1) Pr [B] ≥ α.
(2) for any (x, y) ∈ B, Pry′∈Y
[
(x, y′) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α.
(3) Pr [B|A] ≥ α/δ.
Now we can prove that our second scheme is also unforgeable assuming the hardness of the RSA problem. Since
this scheme is not generic, we cannot apply Theorem 2. Nevertheless, the proof is quite similar to the proof of
Theorem 4; we sketch the parts that are identical and detail only the different parts.
Theorem 6. Let A be a (T, ε, Q1, Q2, Qe, Qs)-successful adversary against the proposed ID-based ring signature
scheme, with security parameter k ≥ 9 and parameter ` ≈ 160 for the hash function, and such that Qs ≤ 2k/24 and
Q2 ≤ 2k/23 .
Then the RSA problem described in Definition 3 can be solved with probability ε′ ≥ ε2769Q2(Q2+1) and within time
T ′ ≤ 2T +2Q2+4(Q1+ nˆQs)Texp, where nˆ is the total number of identities involved in the scheme, and Texp denotes
the time needed to compute a modular exponentiation.
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Proof. We are going to construct a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine F which will use the attacker A
as a sub-routine in order to solve the given instance of the RSA problem. Therefore, F must perfectly simulate the
environment of the attacker A.
The machine F receives the instance (N , e, y), and its goal is to compute a value z ∈ Z∗N such that ze = ymod N .
The machine F initializes the attacker A by defining (N , e) as the master entity RSA public key.
The definition of the public/secret keys for the different identities, the management of the table T ABH1 , the
definition of the value µ = (5/6)1/Qe , and the answers to H1 and secret key extraction queries are done by F
exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, the probability that F does not halt in this process is ≥ 1/6.
As well, F constructs a table T ABH2 to simulate the random oracle H2. Every timeAmakes a query to this oracle,
F looks for this value in the table. If it is already there, thenF sends the corresponding relation toA; if not,F chooses
at random an output of the random oracle for the queried input, different from the outputs which are already in the
table, sends the relation to A and stores it in the table T ABH2 .
Finally, the attacker A can ask Qs times for valid ring signatures for messages M ′ and rings of identities
U ′ = {ID1, . . . , IDn′}, where n′ ≤ nˆ. If βi = 0 for some IDi ∈ U ′, then F knows SKi and can use the standard
signing procedure to obtain a valid signature. Otherwise, the machine F proceeds as follows:
(1) Choose at random c′0 ∈ {0, 1}`.
(2) For i = 0, 1, . . . , n′ − 1, choose Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, and compute Ri = Aei mod N .
(3) For i = 0, 1, . . . , n′ − 2, compute ci+1 = H2(U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri PK cii ), with the same strategy as to answer H2
queries of A.
(4) Impose the relation H2(U ′,M ′, IDn′−1, Rn′−1PK cn′−1n′−1 ) = c′0, and store it in the table T ABH2 .
(5) Send back to A the tuple Θ = (U ′,M ′, c′0, A0, . . . , An−1).
This process results in a valid ring signature, because we are assuming that H2 behaves as a random function, and
c′0 is taken uniformly at random in {0, 1}`. However, the assignment H2(U ′,M ′, IDn′−1, Rn′−1PK
cn′−1
n′−1 ) = c′0 can
produce some collisions in the management of the table T ABH2 that simulates the random oracle H2:
• A first possible collision occurs if a tuple (U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri PK cii ) produced in the simulation of a ring signature has
been already queried to the random oracle H2. The probability of this event is less than
QsQ2
2k
≤ 1/6.
• A second possible collision occurs when the same tuple (U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri PK cii ) is produced in two different
signature simulations. The probability of this event is less than Q
2
s
2 · 12k ≤ 1/6.
We denote by ω the whole set of random tapes that take part in an attack by A, with the environment simulated
by F , but excluding the randomness related to the oracle H2. The success probability of A in forging a valid ring
signature scheme is then taken over the space (ω, H2). If we denote by S the set of successful executions of A, with
the environment simulated by F , we have that
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S]
= Pr[F does not halt AND no-collisions in the simulations AND A succeeds]
≥ ε
(
1− 1
6
− 1
6
− 1
6
)
= ε
2
.
In such an execution of the attacker A, we use the notation Q1,Q2, . . . ,QQ2 for the different queries that A
makes to the random oracle H2. Assume that A produces a valid forged signature (U,M, c0, A0, . . . , An−1), and let
us denote Ri = Aei mod N and ci+1 = H2(U ′,M ′, IDi , Ri PK cii ). By the ideal randomness of the oracle H2, the
probability that A has not asked this oracle for some of the tuples (U,M, IDi , Ri PK cii ), with i = 0, . . . , n − 1 (and
so A must have guessed the corresponding output), is less than n
2`
. For realistic values of the parameters (remember
that we recommend ` ≈ 160), we can safely assume that this probability is less than 1/2.
The opposite fact (i.e. A succeeds and he asks the random oracle H2 for all these queries) is denoted as S ′ and
happens therefore with probability ε2 = ε2
(
1− n
2`
)
≥ ε4 . If this is the case, and because of the ring structure formed
by the queries that A makes to the random oracle H2, there exists at least one index k ∈ {0, 2, . . . , n − 1} such that
the query Qu = (U,M, IDk, Rk PK ckk ) was made to H2 before the query Qv = (U,M, IDk−1, Rk−1PK ck−1k−1 ) (that
is, u < v). This pair (u, v) is called then a gap index. If there are two or more gap indices in a forged signature, we
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consider only the one with the smallest value u. This allows us to define the subset S ′u,v of S ′ as the set of executions
in S ′ whose gap index is (u, v). This gives us a partition of S ′ in exactly Q2(Q2+1)2 classes.
Now we define the set of gap indices which are more likely to appear as
I =
{
(u, v) s.t. Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′] ≥
1
Q2(Q2 + 1)
}
.
And the corresponding subset of successful executions as S ′I = {(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v s.t. (u, v) ∈ I }.
It holds that Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′I | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′] ≥ 1/2. In effect, since the sets S ′u,v are disjoint, we have
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′I | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′] =
∑
(u,v)∈I
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′]
= 1−
∑
(u,v)/∈I
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′].
Since the complement of I contains at most Q2(Q2+1)2 gap indices, we have that this probability is greater than
1− Q2(Q2+1)2 · 1Q2(Q2+1) = 1/2.
Summing up, the probability that a first specific execution (ω˜, H˜2) of A, with the environment simulated by F ,
results in a valid signature with a gap index (u, v) ∈ I , is at least ε2 · 1/2.
Consider now any possible likely gap index (u, v) ∈ I ; we have that
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v] = Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′] · Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′]
≥ ε2 · 1Q2(Q2 + 1) .
We now split the randomness tape H2 as (H ′2, ck), where H ′2 corresponds to the answers of all the queries to H2
except the queryQv , whose answer is denoted as ck . We apply the Splitting Lemma (Lemma 5), taking X = (ω, H ′2),
Y = ck , A = S ′u,v , δ = ε2Q2(Q2+1) and α =
ε2
2Q2(Q2+1) . The lemma ensures the existence of a subset of executions
Ωu,v such that:
Pr[(ω, H2) ∈ Ωu,v | (ω, H2) ∈ S ′u,v] ≥
α
δ
= 1
2
and such that, for any (ω, H2) ∈ Ωu,v:
Pr
c′k
[(ω, H ′2, c′k) ∈ S ′u,v] ≥ δ − α =
ε2
2Q2(Q2 + 1) .
Assuming that the specific execution (ω˜, H˜ ′2, c˜k) is in S ′I , for some specific gap index (u˜, v˜) ∈ I , then with
probability greater than 1/2, the execution is also in Ωu˜,v˜ . In this case, if we now repeat the attack A with fixed
(ω˜, H˜ ′2) and randomly chosen c′k ∈ {0, 1}`, we obtain, with probability ε22Q2(Q2+1)
(
1− 1
2`
)
, a new c′k such that
(ω˜, H˜ ′2, c′k) ∈ S ′u˜,v˜ and such that c′k 6= c˜k .
The total probability of this above mentioned event is then
ε3 = ε2 · 12 ·
1
2
· ε2
2Q2(Q2 + 1)
(
1− 1
2`
)
= ε
2
2
8Q2(Q2 + 1)
(
1− 1
2`
)
≥ ε
2
128Q2(Q2 + 1)
(
1− 1
2`
)
.
The running time of F , for the simulation of the two executions of A, is TF ≤ 2T + 2Q2 + 4(Q1 + nˆQs)Texp.
Now consider the two successful executions of the attack (ω˜, H˜ ′2, c˜k) and (ω˜, H˜ ′2, c′k) that the algorithm
F has obtained, resulting in two valid signatures (U,M, c0, A0, . . . , An−1) and (U,M, c′0, A′0, . . . , A′n−1). Since
the random tapes and H1 are identical, and the answers of the random oracle H2 are the same until the query
Qv˜ = (U,M, IDk−1, Rk−1PK ck−1k−1 ), we have in particular that the queryQu˜ = (U,M, IDk, Rk PK ckk ), which happens
before Qv˜ , is also identical for the two executions. Remember that Ri = Aei mod N ; therefore,
Aek PK
c˜k
k = (A′)ek PK
c′k
k mod N , with c
′
k 6= c˜k .
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Now we look for the entry (IDk, PKk, xk, βk) in the table T ABH1 . With probability 1 − µ, we have βk = 1,
which means that PKk = H1(IDk) = yxek mod N . Replacing this value in the equation above, we obtain
(Ak/A′k)e · x
(c′k−c˜k )e
k = y c˜k−c
′
k mod N . Repeating the same argument (Bezout’s identity) as in the last part of the
proof of Theorem 4, we have that ae + b(c˜k − c′k) = 1 for two integers a and b. Then the value
z =
(
Ak/A
′
k · xc
′
k−c˜k
k
)b
· ya mod N
is a solution of the given instance of the RSA problem, because ze = ymod N .
The final success probability is therefore ε′ = (1 − µ)ε3. Using again that 1 − µ ≥ 1/6Qe (applying Taylor’s
series) and taking into account that 2` ≥ 769, we obtain
ε′ ≥ (1− µ) ε
2
128Q2(Q2 + 1)
(
1− 1
2`
)
≥ ε
2
769Q2(Q2 + 1) . 
Even if this relation (the quality of the reduction) is still quite bad, it is much better than the security relation for
the first scheme (see Section 4.2), because now the factor VQ2,nˆ does not appear and so the reduction is independent
of the number of members in the rings. Considering the same example as in the end of Section 4.2, in order to ensure
that attacks against this second scheme with T ≈ 260, ε ≈ 2−10 and Q2 ≈ 260 do not exist, we should take an RSA
modulus with around 104 bits, independently of the size of the considered rings.
6. Additional properties and extensions
In this section we discuss some interesting properties of the ring signature schemes that we have presented in the
previous section. Namely, we first prove that the author of a ring signature can, if desired, convince anyone that he is
the real signer (furthermore, attacking this property is equivalent to solving the RSA problem). Then, we show how
to design distributed ring signature schemes using similar ideas as those in Section 5. Although we exemplify and
analyze these extensions and properties with the first proposed ring signature scheme (in Section 4), the same results
are also valid for the second scheme (in Section 5).
6.1. Opening a ring signature
The ring signature schemes proposed in Sections 4 and 5 satisfy the following property: a user who has computed
a ring signature can later open the anonymity of the signature and prove to everybody that he is the actual author of
this signature. Other ring signature schemes proposed in the literature [1,26,17,18] seem to enjoy the same property,
although this has never been explicitly stated or formalized. Here we present a relatively formal treatment of this
property.
This is done by adding two algorithms to the ring signature scheme: the Opening protocol is executed by the real
signer ID, and results in some convincing proof cv p f for the authority of some ring signature. Later, the Convincing
protocol is executed by any other party, by taking as input a signature, an identity ID and a convincing proof cv p f ;
the result is 1 if the proof is correct, and 0 otherwise.
In the case of the scheme proposed in Section 4, if a user with identity IDs has followed the described algorithm to
compute a ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ), and later he wants to reveal his identity as the real
author of the signature, he must broadcast his identity IDs and all the random values {Ai }i 6=s and A chosen in steps 1
and 2 of the signing protocol; formally, we have cv p f = {A, {Ai }i 6=s}.
Later, with the Convincing protocol, everybody can then check that Aei = Ri mod N , for all i 6= s, and that
Ae = Rs ·
∏
i 6=s
H1(IDi )
hi mod N .
If the checks are valid, then people are convinced that the actual author of the ring signatureΘ is the user with identity
IDs .
Obviously, we must show that this procedure cannot be attacked. To formalize this idea, we must define the
capabilities and goals of an adversary trying to attack this opening property of a ring signature scheme. There are
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two kinds of possible attacks. In both cases, the attacker is allowed to ask for Qe secret keys for identities of his
choice, and to ask for Qs valid ring signatures for messages and rings of his choice.
On the one hand, a first possible attack happens if an attacker outputs a valid ring signature Θ , an identity IDt ∈ U
and a convincing proof cv p f such that:
(1) the secret key of identity IDt was not queried during the attack; and
(2) Convincing(Θ, IDt , cv p f ) = 1.
This attack captures the situation where a coalition of dishonest users want to accuse some honest user of having
signed a message that he actually did not sign.
On the other hand, the second possible attack occurs if an attacker receives as input a valid ring signature Θ
for some ring U and some message M , and is able to output a valid convincing proof cv p f for some member of
IDt ∈ U (in this case, the attacker is allowed to corrupt even all the members of U). This captures the situation where
a dishonest user tries to convince people that he is the author of a previous ring signature that he “saw” in the network.
If a ring signature scheme resists both kinds of attacks, then we say that it enjoys the opening property. We now
show that the opening property of the ring signature scheme in Section 4 cannot be broken, assuming the RSA
Assumption. For simplicity, we only present a sketch of the proof and we do not give the exact security relations.
The detailed and complete proof can be easily obtained by combining this one with the techniques in the proof of
Theorem 4.
Theorem 7. In the random oracle model for the hash functions H1 and H2, if the opening property of the proposed
identity-based ring signature scheme can be broken, then the RSA problem described in Definition 3 can be solved.
Proof (Sketch). With respect to the first kind of attacks, let us denote as A the hypothetical attacker against the
opening property of the scheme. We want to use this attacker to find a solution of a given instance (N , e, y) of the
RSA problem.
Queries to the H1 and H2 random oracles are answered in the standard way (see proof of Theorem 4). In particular,
for each identity IDi we will have H1(IDi ) = yxei mod N with probability µ, and H1(IDi ) = xei mod N with
probability 1 − µ, where µ ∈ (0, 1) is some appropriate real number, and where the value xi is chosen (and known)
by us.
If all the identities IDi whose secret key is requested by the attacker satisfy H1(IDi ) = xei mod N , then we
can properly answer these queries. In this case, the attacker A succeeds with some non-negligible probability and
outputs a valid signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ), an identity IDt ∈ U and a valid convincing proof
cv p f = {A, {Ai }i 6=t } satisfying Aei = Ri mod N for all i 6= t , and
Ae = Rt ·
∏
i 6=t
H1(IDi )
hi mod N .
Combining this equation with the verification equation of the valid ring signature Θ , we have
Ae = σ e · H1(IDt )−ht ·
∏
i 6=t
R−1i mod N .
With some probability, we have that H1(IDt ) = yxet mod N . If this is the case, and using the fact that Aei =
Ri mod N for all i 6= t , we can write
yht =
 σAxhtt ∏
i 6=t
Ai

e
mod N .
Since ht is an output of the hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`, we have that ht < 2` < e. Recall that the
element e is a prime number, so with overwhelming probability it holds gcd(e, ht ) = 1. This means that there
exist two integers a and b such that ae + bht = 1 (applying Bezout’s identity). Finally it is quite easy to see
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that the value
z =
 σAxhtt ∏
i 6=t
Ai

b
· ya mod N
satisfies ze = ymod N and is therefore a solution of the given instance of the RSA problem.
With respect to the second kind of attacks, let us denote as B the attacker who asks for a valid ring signature
for some pair (U,M), and is able to output a valid convincing proof for some of the members of U . We can
use such an attacker in order to solve a given instance (N , e, y) of the RSA problem. In this case, we can define
H1(IDi ) = xei mod N for all the identities (i.e. we can answer all the secret key queries from B). When B asks for a
valid ring signature for some pair (U,M), where the ring is U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, we choose at random a user IDs ∈ U
and then we act as follows:
(1) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= s, choose αi ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise different; compute Ri = yαei mod N .
(2) By querying the random oracle H2, compute hi = H2(U,M, IDi , Ri ), for all i 6= s.
(3) Choose at random hs ∈ {0, 1}`, and σ ∈ Z∗N .
(4) Compute Rs = (σ )e · H1(IDs)−hs · ∏
i 6=s
(
R−1i · H1(IDi )−hi
)
mod N . If Rs = 1mod N or Rs = Ri for some i 6= s,
then go back to the previous step.
(5) “Falsify” the random oracle H2, by imposing the relation H2(U,M, IDs, Rs) = hs .
(6) Send to B the ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
Assume that the attacker B is able to output an identity IDt ∈ U and a valid convincing proof cv p f = {A, {Ai }i 6=t }
that IDt is the author of the signature Θ . If there exists some identity ID j ∈ U different from IDt and IDs , then we
have that Aej = R j = yαej mod N . Therefore the value z = A j/α j mod N satisfies ze = ymod N and is the desired
solution of the RSA problem.
If the ring U = {IDs, IDt } contains only two users, then we have Rt = yαet mod N and
Aes = Rs = σ eH1(IDs)−hs H1(IDt )−ht R−1t = σ e(x−hss )e(x−htt )ey−1α−et mod N .
Using the same methodology that we have already used in other parts of this paper, we can apply Bezout’s identity
and derive from the equation above a value z satisfying ze = ymod N , i.e. a solution of the given instance of the RSA
problem. 
6.2. Distributed ring signatures
The concept of ring signature can be extended to that of distributed ring signature: a subset of users cooperate to
sign a message on behalf of a family of possibly signing subsets. This family is chosen ad hoc by the signers just
before computing the signature, with the restriction that the signing subset must be one of the subsets of the family.
The verifier of the signature is convinced that all the users in some of the subsets of the family have cooperated to
sign, but he has no information about which is the actually signing subset.
Distributed ring signatures were introduced in [7], where a scheme for threshold families is proposed, based on
RSA. More general constructions for threshold families have been proposed in [25,9]. A pair of schemes supporting
more general families of signing subsets can be found in [19,18]. Below, we describe a new identity-based distributed
ring signature scheme for general signing families, which does not employ bilinear pairings. The ideas in the design
of this scheme are the same as in the ring signature scheme of Section 4 (a similar extension is also possible for the
ring signature scheme presented in Section 5).
Setup: on input of a security parameter k, the master entity generates two random k-bit prime numbers p and q. Then
he computes N = pq. For some fixed parameter ` (for example ` = 160), he chooses at random a prime number e
satisfying 2` < e < 2`+1 and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1, and computes d = e−1modφ(N ). Furthermore, the master entity
chooses two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`. The public outputs of this setup algorithm
are params= (k, `, N , e, H1, H2). The secret information stored by the master entity is master-key= (p, q, d).
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Extract: when a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ requests for his secret key, the master entity computes SK =
H1(ID)d mod N and sends this value to the user.
Distributed Ring Signature Generation: suppose a subset of users Us want to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ on behalf
of a family of r subsets U = {U1, . . . ,Ur } such that Us ∈ U . We will assume that such a subset of users can always
have access to an authenticated broadcast channel, while the information in this channel remains as a secret to the rest
of users.
For each of the sets Ui ∈ U , we consider the public value
Yi =
∏
ID j∈ Ui
H1(ID j ) =
 ∏
ID j∈ Ui
SK j
e mod N .
Members of the signing set Us ∈ U jointly perform the following algorithm (we will denote, for simplicity,
Us = {ID1, . . . , IDns }):
(1) Each user ID j ∈ Us chooses at random As j ∈ Z∗N and computes Rs j = Aes j mod N . He broadcasts the value Rs j .
(2) One of the users in Us , for example ID1, chooses, for all i = 1, . . . , r , i 6= s, random values Ai ∈ Z∗N , pairwise
different, and computes Ri = Aei mod N . He broadcasts these values Ri , and therefore all the members of Us can
compute hi = H2(U,M,Ui , Ri ), for all i = 1, . . . , r , i 6= s.
(3) Members of Us compute the value
Rs =
 ∏
ID j∈ Us
Rs j
 · ( ∏
1≤i≤r,i 6=s
Y−hii
)
mod N .
If Rs = 1 or Rs = Ri for some i = 1, . . . , d , i 6= s, they return to step 1. Members of Us can then compute
hs = H2(U,M,Us, Rs).
(4) User ID1 computes and broadcasts the value σ1 = As1 · SK hs1 ·
∏
1≤i≤r,i 6=s
Ai mod N .
(5) For j = 2, . . . , ns , user ID j computes and broadcasts the value σ j = σ j−1 · As j · SK hsj mod N .
(6) Define σ = σns .
(7) The resulting signature is (U,M, R1, . . . , Rr , h1, . . . , hr , σ ).
Ring Signature Verification: The validity of the signature is verified by the recipient of the message by checking
that hi = H2(U,M,Ui , Ri ), for i = 1, . . . , r and that the following equation fulfills:
σ e =
∏
1≤i≤r
(
Ri · Y hii
)
mod N ,
where the values Yi are computed as Yi = ∏
ID j∈Ui
H1(ID j )mod N , for i = 1, . . . , r .
6.2.1. Some remarks
It is possible to prove that this scheme achieves the required properties of correctness, anonymity and
unforgeability, by using the same techniques as in the ring signature scheme described and analyzed in Sections 4
and 4.1. In fact, this distributed ring signature scheme can be seen as a ring signature scheme where the ring is a
family of subsets, and members of the ring are now subsets of users Ui with “public key” Yi = ∏
ID j∈Ui
H1(ID j )mod N
and secret key SKi = ∏
ID j∈Ui
SK j mod N .
Finally, the resulting distributed ring signatures can be opened if all the signers cooperate. Every signer ID j ∈ Us
broadcasts the value As j , and then the first signer ID1 broadcasts the values {Ai }1≤i≤r,i 6=s . Later, everybody can check
that Ri = Aei mod N for all i 6= s, and that ∏
ID j∈ Us
As j
e = Rs · ∏
1≤i≤r,i 6=s
Y hii mod N .
If the checks are valid, then one is convinced that the actually signing subset has been Us .
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7. Conclusion
The paper by Boneh and Franklin about identity-based public key encryption from bilinear pairings [6] led to a
revolution in the field of identity-based cryptography. Since then, most of the proposals employ bilinear pairings, not
only for encryption but also for signatures, key agreement, etc. However, it is not easy to find appropriate groups where
efficient bilinear pairings can be implemented, so it is still interesting to design efficient identity-based cryptosystems
which do not employ bilinear pairings. This seems to be hard for public key encryption (it is actually an interesting
open problem, see [10] for an inefficient scheme). However, for digital signatures, some efficient schemes without
pairings, based on the RSA primitive, were introduced in the 80s, by Shamir [24] and by Guillou and Quisquater [16].
In this work we use this last scheme as a basis to construct identity-based ring signature and distributed ring
signature schemes. Note that for this kind of schemes, which involve many public keys, it is specially interesting
to consider an identity-based construction which avoids the management of many digital certificates. Our schemes
are the first (distributed) ring signature schemes for identity-based scenarios which do not employ bilinear pairings.
An interesting property of the proposed ring signature schemes is also formally presented and analyzed: opening the
anonymity of a signature is possible when the real author wants to do so. The security of all the considered schemes
can be formally proved in the random oracle model.
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